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 ABSTRACT 
This paper looks at the gendered impacts of a development project that provided 
improved dairy cattle and training as part of a broader effort to develop a 
smallholder-friendly, market-oriented dairy value chain in Manica province, 
Mozambique. The project targeted households, registered cows in the name of the 
household head, and, initially, trained registered cow owners in various aspects of 
dairy production and marketing. Subsequently training was expanded to two 
members per household to increase the capacity within households to care for 
cows, a change which resulted in a significant number of women being trained. 
Using qualitative and quantitative data on dairy production and consumption and on 
gendered control over income and assets, the paper explores how men and women 
participated in and benefited from the project. We find that despite being registered 
to men, in practice dairy cattle are in some cases viewed as jointly owned by men 
and women. Beneficiary households dramatically increased dairy production and 
income, with men, women, and children all contributing labor. Women’s incentives 
for participation in dairy are less clear. Despite their recognized rights and 
responsibilities related to dairy cow management, women exercise relatively little 
control over milk and milk income as compared to men. Various explanations 
related to monetary and nonmonetary benefits of MSDDP and dairying for women 
are explored, along with their implications for women’s level of effort and overall 
project outcomes. 
Keywords: gender, assets, dairy development, property rights, mixed methods 
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TRANSFER PROJECTS:  
Lessons from the Manica Smallholder Dairy Development Program 
Nancy Johnson,1 Jemimah Njuki, Elizabeth Waithanji, Marinho Nhambeto, Martha 
Rogers, and Elizabeth Hutchinson Kruger 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Many agricultural development interventions distribute assets and build skills with 
the intention of improving the welfare of poor farming households. Such 
interventions often use the household as the unit of analysis for identifying their 
intended beneficiaries. In practice, however, assets and skills are rarely transferred 
to households but rather to individuals within households. While the expectation is 
that simply having an asset in the household will benefit all members, there is 
strong evidence that household members do not necessarily pool their resources 
towards the achievement of shared goals (Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997). 
Rather, individuals within households often have different preferences for how they 
would like to see their own and household resources used, and the final outcome is 
often negotiated, based in part of how asset ownership is defined and distributed 
(Doss 2006; Manser and Brown 1980). 
Projects that define beneficiaries as households rather than individuals are 
often referred to as “gender-blind.” While such projects do not explicitly target men 
or seek to benefit them disproportionately, that outcome often results. One way 
this happens is when the point of contact between the project and the household is 
the household head, usually a man. Where more than one household member 
participates in the project—for example, attending project events or taking up the 
activities that the project is promoting—the costs of participation may be 
distributed unequally among household members, and not necessarily in line with 
how benefits are distributed. The determinants of how benefits and costs of 
projects are distributed are complex, and depend on culturally defined gender roles, 
how property rights are defined in the law and in practice, and on the 
characteristics of households and individuals. Failure to consider how benefits and 
costs will be distributed when projects are designed, implemented, and evaluated 
could lead to inaccurate or incomplete estimates of net benefits, especially for key 
beneficiary groups like women and children.  
The Manica Smallholder Dairy Development program (MSDDP) was a gender-
blind intervention that targeted households, distributed dairy cows to household 
heads, and trained household members in dairy-related production and marketing. 
Because two individuals per household were ultimately trained, in many cases both 
a man and a woman in a household received training. The purpose of this study is 
to identify and understand the gendered impacts of this gender-blind intervention, 
in particular on women’s control of dairy income and ownership of assets. This 
study uses quantitative and qualitative methods to document local gender roles and 
1Corresponding Author: (n.johnson@cgiar.org). 
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                                                       norms around dairy production and asset ownership, and to explore how men, 
women, and children in beneficiary households participated in, perceived, and 
benefitted from the project activities.  
The following section describes the conceptual framework for the analysis 
based on the role of assets in agricultural development projects. Section 3 
describes the Mozambique dairy sector and the MSDDP. Section 4 explains how and 
where data were collected. Section 5 describes men’s and women’s participation in 
the MSDDP. Section 6 looks at the impacts of the program on household milk 
production, consumption, and sales. Section 7 analyzes the gendered control over 
dairy income and how it influences expenditure and investment patterns of women 
and men. The paper concludes by summarizing the results and their implications for 
programs and for research. 
2.  GENDER, ASSETS AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
A growing body of evidence documents the gender gap in asset ownership, with 
men owning more assets and assets of higher value than women (Doss, Grown, 
and Deere 2008; Doss et al. 2011; FAO 2009; FAO 2011). The causes and 
consequences of this gap are diverse, and a focus of ongoing research. In the 
context of agricultural development programs, Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011) identify 
the main pathways through which assets can shape and be shaped by livelihoods 
strategies (Figure 1), and how they might vary depending on who owns the asset 
(shading of boxes in Figure 1). Ownership of or access to assets can influence the 
livelihood strategies available to individuals and households. For example, access to 
land may be necessary to engage in crop farming. Less obvious is that access to 
land may also be necessary for keeping livestock because even if animals are kept 
in stalls rather than grazed, they require feed that must be grown, gathered, or 
purchased. Human capital in the form of education or specialized skills may also be 
required for some livelihood strategies. Access to large social networks may be an 
advantage for some livelihood strategies. Men and women in a household may 
engage in joint livelihood strategies, or they may pursue strategies individually 
depending on the resources available to them. To the extent that men and women 
have access to different types and quantities of assets, their options in terms of 
livelihood strategies will be different. 
 
 
2 Figure 1: Schematic representation of a gendered livelihood conceptual 
framework  
 
Source: Meinzen-Dick et al. 2011 
The full income—cash income plus the value of home production and leisure 
time—that results from these livelihood strategies determines what households 
have available for consumption and reinvestment. Whether the income is controlled 
by men or women may affect how it is spent, with implications for development 
outcomes (Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997; Lundberg, Pollack, and Wales 
1997). Through its effect on livelihoods strategies and on bargaining power of 
individuals in intrahousehold negotiations, ownership of assets is often a 
determinant of who controls the income and how it is spent (Doss 2006; 
Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003; Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 2002). 
Knowing who owns an asset may seem straightforward, however there are 
often different types of rights—often referred to as bundles of rights—that 
individuals and communities can have over an asset, and different people may hold 
different types of rights over the same asset. Rights are often divided into two main 
types: use rights and control or decision rights (Meinzen-Dick, Pradhan, and de 
Gregorio 2004). Differences between use and decision rights will vary by the type of 
resource or asset; some examples include the right to milk a cow (use right) versus 
the right to sell the cow (control right), or the right to fish from a pond (use) versus 
the right to fence the pond and prevent others from using it (control). State and 
customary patrimonial laws and gendered institutions in rural areas of developing 
countries often create complex systems of determining ownership, control, use, and 
disposition of productive assets (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002; Mabsout and 
van Staveren 2010).  
Ownership of livestock in developing countries reflects complexities of both 
gender and property rights. There is a tendency for men to own large livestock such 
as cattle while women own small livestock such as chickens, pigs, and goats (Dillon 
and Quinones 2010; Doss et al. 2011; FAO 2009; FAO 2011; Kristjanson et al. 
2010). While women may be able to sell a chicken without permission but not a 
 
 
3 cow, women are often responsible for milking cows and therefore have some 
control over milk and milk income (Valdivia 2001). The extent to which women can 
control the income from milk rather than just the milk itself is a critical issue that 
affects whether women benefit from expansion of market access (Huss-Ashmore 
1996; Njuki et al. 2011a; Njuki et al. 2011c; Thomas-Slayter and Bhatt 1994; von 
Braun and Webb 1989). Even where women’s control is acknowledged, however, it 
can also be contested. In their study in northern Kenya, McPeak and Doss (2006) 
reported that although dairy production within the Gabra nomadic pastoral 
community was characterized by gender and age, men used migration decisions—
where to move the herd in search of pasture—to limit their wives’ ability to market 
the milk, resulting in more milk available for the calves and less income for the 
women. 
Agricultural development programs tend to influence assets in two main 
ways. They can increase the stock of assets, for example by distributing land, 
livestock, or agricultural equipment, or improving human or social capital. 
Agricultural projects can also change the returns to existing stocks of productive 
assets by making available improved technologies such as seeds, improved fodder 
and feed, or fertilizers. Gender is likely to be important in both of these avenues. 
How and to whom the rights to distributed assets are assigned, whose assets see 
greatest returns from improved technologies, and who controls how those returns 
are used will ultimately influence who in the households benefits from the 
intervention and how much. 
3.   THE MANICA SMALLHOLDER DAIRY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 
In 2000, the total national cattle herd in Mozambique numbered over half a million 
head, but fewer than two thousand were exotic dairy cows or crosses (Ministry of 
Agriculture 2010). The dairy industry in Mozambique is virtually nonexistent, due in 
part to the unfavorable agroecological conditions but also to other factors such as 
the country’s long civil war. Milk production was lower in 2006 (68,800 tons) than it 
was in 1980 (71,500 tons) (Zvomuya 2009). As a result, the country depends 
almost entirely on imported milk from South Africa and Europe, estimated to be 
about 120,000 liters a day. The average Mozambican consumes 5.7 liters of milk 
annually, down 63 percent from 9.1 liters in 1990, well below the world average of 
about 79 liters (Zvomuya 2009). 
In July 2008, Land O’Lakes International Development was awarded a Food 
for Progress Program by United Stated Department of Agriculture (USDA) to 
implement a 42-month smallholder dairy development program in Manica province 
in central Mozambique. One objective of the program was to rebuild the country’s 
dairy herd in a way that would integrate smallholder farmers into in the dairy value 
chain.2 Participants in the MSDDP received an improved dairy cow, training in 
fodder crop and pasture management and animal husbandry, and assistance to 
establish producer-level cooperatives and milk collection centers to assure that milk 
2 The larger program included both the dairy component and a crop production component focused 
on animal traction. The components were implemented by different organizations and occurred in 
different parts of Manica province. This evaluation focuses only on the dairy component, which was 
conducted in a specific part of the province that is appropriate for dairy development. 
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                                                       produced by smallholders enters a cold chain and is handled properly to maintain 
quality. In total, the MSDDP distributed 500 cows. 
The dairy zone of Manica lies within a 50 km radius of Chimoio, the capital of 
Manica province, and includes the administrative posts of Amatongas, Gondola-
Sede, Matsinho, and Zembe in Gondola district and Vanduzi in Manica district 
(Figure 2). Any household in the project area that fulfilled the project pre-qualifying 
conditions was encouraged to participate. The conditions included the commitment 
of at least two household members to attend all the prescribed trainings, 
possession of adequate access to land and water, proximity to a milk collection 
center (MCC), active participation in a community group or cooperative, and the 
planting of pasture and fodder crops prior to receiving the dairy cow. 
Figure 2: Map of project sites 
 
Source: Land O’ Lakes 
Two members of each household were required to participate in trainings. 
Trainees were issued with a certificate after completing 75 percent of the modules. 
Once both trainees in a household were certified, the household was given an in-
calf (4–6 months pregnant) heifer. If the cow gave birth to a female calf, the owner 
was obligated to pass it on to the project when it was 18 months old so that it could 
be given to another household. 
 
 
5 Initially, only one member of each household was required to complete the 
training before receiving a heifer, however project staff observed that some of the 
cows that had been distributed to households were not being cared for properly. 
They also observed that while the majority of the trainees were men, women were 
responsible for many aspects of caring for the cow. The project had implicitly 
assumed that men would share the knowledge gained in the trainings with other 
household members. One explanation for the observed poor management of the 
cows was that this was not happening. As a result, in mid-2010 the project 
amended the rules of participation to require that two members of each household 
participate in order to ensure that there was more capacity within households to 
care for the cow. In many households, these were usually a man and a woman. 
4.   DATA USED IN THE STUDY 
Quantitative and qualitative methods were used to analyze the role of gender in the 
MSDDP. The quantitative data were compiled from household surveys administered 
by Land O’ Lakes in 2011 and 2012 that gathered household-level data on dairy 
production and food security and sex-disaggregated data on household 
demographics, asset ownership, and agricultural labor. Households were drawn 
from a random sample selected as part of a baseline survey in 2009. The baseline 
sample included households that ultimately became beneficiaries as well as 
households that did not because they did not meet the project participation criteria 
described above. Because beneficiary households met the criteria and non-
beneficiary household did not, they did not constitute a comparable sample of 
participants and non-participants. Therefore, the analysis focused only on 
beneficiary households. The dataset contains 125 households surveyed in 2011 and 
150 surveyed in 2012. Ninety-eight households were in both survey rounds so the 
total number of unique beneficiary households is 193. All of the households reside 
in Manica province with about 50 percent of households in Manica district and 50 
percent in Gondola district. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on household 
asset, demographic, and program participation variables. 
Table 1: Distribution of trainees by category and relationship to household 
head (percent) 
   First trainee  Second trainee 
Husband/hh head  66  4 
Spouse  4  63 
Father   9  1 
Mother  10  0 
Daughter  0  6 
Son  1  14 
Other  10  12 
  100  100 
Source: Land O’Lakes monitoring data 
 
 
6 At the time of the 2011 survey, 80 percent of surveyed households had 
received cows from the program. By 2012, all households had received cows. The 
2011 data permit comparison of recipients to non-recipients, and in both data sets 
we can look for effects of having had the cow for a longer period of time. However 
whether and when a household received a cow is at least partly endogenous. Some 
of the delays were due to MSDDP decisions and to how quickly calves became 
available, however households could influence how quickly their trainees graduated 
from the training program and thus became eligible. The same household 
characteristics that influenced these decisions are likely to be associated with 
outcomes such as agricultural productivity, income or food security. Our inability to 
control completely for this endogeneity limits the usefulness of these data for a 
rigorous impact evaluation, however we can use the data to explore how the 
MSDDP both influences and is influenced by gender relations and gendered access 
to assets.  
To better understand how local perceptions related to assets ownership and 
MSDDP, focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted within communities where 
the dairy intervention took place. Groups were single sex (either all men or all 
women) and were broken down by geographic location and whether or not 
households had received their dairy cows through the program. In total, 14 FGDs—
seven all men and seven all women—were conducted in 2011. Ten groups had 
received cows and four were still waiting; the number of participants per groups 
ranged between 5 and 13. In March 2013, another two FGDs were conducted with 
women and men separately at the Vanduzi milk collection center in Manica district. 
This second set of FGDs was designed to explore specific issues identified during 
quantitative evaluation. Topics included training, labor and labor substitution, 
beneficiaries’ interest in continuing dairy farming, milk consumption and dairy 
income management, milk marketing and income use, bull calf marketing, and 
income use.  
Qualitative data collection tools were translated from English to Portuguese, 
and enumerators/FGD facilitators trained in Portuguese. The 
enumerators/facilitators/recorders then translated the questions in Portuguese to 
one of the local languages (Tchimanika, Chiute or Shona) and then recorded the 
responses in Portuguese. These responses were then translated to English. 
5.   PARTICIPATION OF MEN AND WOMEN IN THE MSDDP 
Training  
As mentioned above, the initial program plan called for training only one person in 
the household, usually the man. Many households appeared to be having difficulty 
taking care of their cows, and it was felt that this was due to the fact that improved 
dairy cattle are management-intensive, and training only one person did not ensure 
that there was sufficient capacity within the household to provide proper care for 
the cow. The program staff made a decision to train one other person from each 
household. Program staff also observed that women were playing an important role 
in caring for the cows, and that involving them in the training could be beneficial to 
the household. It was, however, not a requirement that the second trainee be a 
woman. According to program staff and FGD participants, it was left up to the 
 
 
7 household members to agree among themselves who would be the “secondary” 
trainee. The most common outcome was that the household head and spouse were 
trained, but other family members such as parents or children were also sometimes 
the registered trainees (Table 1). 
As a result of this change in the rules of participation, over 60 percent of 
project households (60 percent in 2011 survey and 68 percent in 2012 survey) had 
a woman trained. Direct engagement of women in program activities can be 
empowering as opposed to reinforcing the secondary role of women by assuming 
that when men were trained, they would pass on the information and skills to 
women. A study on intensification of dairy in the Kenyan coast found that where 
women in male-headed households were the contact farmers with extension 
agents, they reported greater access to and autonomy over household resources 
and decision making (Mullins et al. 1996). Unfortunately given how trainees were 
chosen in MSDDP, it would be difficult to determine whether women were more 
empowered because they were trained or were trained because they were more 
empowered.  
To understand better why some households chose to select women as 
trainees, we ran several regression models in order to investigate the drivers of 
households having female trainees (Table 2). Only the baseline asset index is 
significant, though the size of the impact is negligible. Household with more assets 
are less likely to have a woman as a trainee.  
Table 2: Determinants of whether a household had a female trainee 
   Female trainee 
   Linear probability model  Probit  Logit 
Household size  0.0182  0.0517  0.0860 
   (0.0123)  (0.0363)  (0.0620) 
Number of children (<12 yrs.) in HH  -0.0098  -0.0269  -0.0453 
   (0.0235)  (0.0679)  (0.1118) 
Sex of household head  -0.0941  -0.3120  -0.4967 
   (0.1889)  (0.6484)  (1.1300) 
Average yrs. of education for females 
over 12 yrs. of age 
0.0078  0.0241  0.0364 
   (0.0144)  (0.0401)  (0.0657) 
Baseline asset index (2009)  -0.0015**  -0.0040*  -0.0065* 
   (0.0007)  (0.0020)  (0.0034) 
Constant  0.6510***  0.4206  0.6715 
   (0.2380)  (0.7642)  (1.3272) 
Observations  144  144  144 
           
Standard errors in parentheses    
="* p<0.10   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01" 
Source: data from 2012 household survey  
 
 
8 Where a beneficiary household—one that completed training and received a 
cow—had a female trainee is influenced not only by whether the households initially 
selected a woman, but also by whether both members successfully completed the 
training. According to FGD participants female trainees generally lagged behind 
male trainees, and more women dropped out than men. The reason given for the 
higher dropout rate among some women was that their farms were far from 
settlements where community activities such as trainings take place. This suggests 
that the household geographical location, specifically proximity to the nearest town 
or community center, is likely to be an important determinant of whether a 
beneficiary household had a female trainee.  
Distribution of cows 
Households that met the project conditions received a Jersey cow. Cows were 
registered to the household head, which means that in over 90 percent of surveyed 
households the cow was registered to a man. The implicit assumption in this 
allocation was that cattle belonged to men. FGD participants confirmed that 
according to local custom cattle are owned by men. The quantitative survey results, 
however, showed that only 52 percent of cattle were reported to be owned 
exclusively by men in 2009 when the project began (Table 3, column 1).3  Women 
exclusively owned only 15 percent, but 43 percent of cattle were reported as owned 
jointly by men and women. While men own a larger share of all types of household 
assets than women, these data suggest that women have significant ownership 
rights in nearly all asset categories.  
 
Table 3: Asset summary statistics: baseline (2009) versus 2012 
Asset   2009  2012 
Acres of land owned  3.02 
(4.27) 
3.88* 
(4.37) 
Proportion of land male owned  0.52 
(0.46) 
0.50 
(0.46) 
Proportion of land female owned  0.26 
(0.40) 
0.20 
(0.35) 
Proportion of land jointly owned  0.22 
(0.40) 
0.30 
(0.44) 
Number of cattle owned  3.53 
(4.81) 
3.93 
(4.25) 
Proportion of cattle male owned  0.42 
(.44) 
0.44 
(.45) 
Proportion of cattle female owned  0.15 
(.32) 
0.13 
(.29) 
Proportion of cattle jointly owned  0.43 
(.45) 
0.43 
(.46) 
3 We estimated baseline (2009) asset ownership using recall questions in the 2011 and 2012 surveys 
that ask how many of the currently owned assets had been acquired since 2009 and how many had 
been lost/sold/given away, and by whom, since 2009. 
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                                                       Asset   2009  2012 
Number of local cattle owned  2.53 
(4.72) 
2.39 
(4.03) 
Number of crossbreed owned  0.02 
(.18) 
0.05 
(.24) 
Number of exotic owned  1.05 
(1.28) 
1.49*** 
(1.31) 
Total household physical assets not including land or 
livestock (value of index+) 
39.87 
(54.82) 
43.21 
(56.28) 
Domestic assets (value of index+)  11.07 
(11.79) 
11.89 
(12.12) 
Proportion of male domestic assets  0.38 
(.37) 
0.42 
(.35) 
Proportion of female domestic assets  0.16 
(.24) 
0.15 
(.24) 
Proportion of jointly owned domestic assets  0.46 
(.40) 
0.43 
(.39) 
Transportation assets (value of index+)  19.43 
(43.01) 
21.39 
(43.42) 
Proportion of male transportation assets  0.66 
(.46) 
0.67 
(.45) 
Proportion of female transportation assets  0.02 
(.12) 
0.03 
(.17) 
Proportion of jointly owned transportation 
assets 
0.32 
(.45) 
0.29 
(.43) 
Production assets (value of index+)  9.38 
(9.85) 
9.94 
(10.11) 
Proportion of male production assets  0.16 
(.31) 
0.19 
(.32) 
Proportion of female production assets  0.11 
(.26) 
0.10 
(.26) 
Proportion of jointly owned production assets  0.73 
(.38) 
0.71 
(.39) 
Observations  150  150 
+ The asset index assigns weights to various household assets and creates an index based 
on the combined assets. See Njuki et al. (2011b) for description of asset weights. 
Asterisks indicate difference between 2009 and 2012; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01" 
Source: Data from 2012 household survey 
To better understand how asset ownership is defined and understood in the 
project area, focus groups were asked about what it means for men and women to 
own assets individually and jointly. The discussion started broadly talking about all 
assets, and then narrowed to focus on cattle. In response to the question on what it 
means for a man or a woman to own an asset, both men’s and women’s groups 
generally responded that ownership means the ability to utilize the asset at any 
time without having to ask permission. In the Vanduzi FGD, a man indicated that 
“when I am away a woman cannot lend an axe without asking me.” When asked 
 
 
10 whether the same was true about plates, the man answered “no, plates belong to 
women so they can lend them out without asking for permission.” Most of the men 
in the group agreed with this view. This implies a type of right that goes beyond 
use—lending is a type of control right—and also that some types of assets are 
owned by women and others by men. 
Some of the men participants indicated women could own assets acquired 
from another marriage, implying that ownership can depend not just on the type of 
asset but also how and when it was acquired. It may also depend on how the 
previous marriage ended. In one group, a majority of the participants said all 
assets belong to men because women can’t take any assets with them in case of a 
divorce.  
Responding to a question on what it means to own an asset jointly, most 
men said all assets that benefited everyone were jointly owned. Such assets were 
used without asking for anybody’s permission, for example domestic assets such as 
the house, furniture and dishes. In five groups, most of the women said they 
considered assets to be jointly owned when all household members used them and 
cared for them. These comments suggest a situation where use rights could be joint 
even when decision rights are not. This seems likely to occur where assets are used 
regularly by household members to the extent that it would be impractical to 
repeatedly ask permission.  
Before presenting the results about ownership of MSDDP cows, it is useful to 
discuss the meaning of use rights and ownership rights for dairy cattle. Use rights 
relate to use of the milk or other outputs (such as manure) from the cow while 
decision rights relate to management (housing, feeding, preventing and treating 
disease), breeding, or alienation (sale or gift) of the cow itself. A distinction is often 
made between personal use of the outputs of an asset (use rights) and commercial 
use (usufruct rights). This is likely to be important in the context of market-
oriented dairying.  
When asked specifically about ownership of the MSDDP cows, most of the 
male focus group participants emphasized that men owned the cows in male-
headed households and women owned them in female-headed households. Women, 
however, had different views. While some agreed that men owned the cows, others 
said the cows were jointly owned and could even be owned by the women despite 
being registered in the name of the man.  
All FGD discussants were asked how registration of the cow in the man’s 
name influenced women’s decision making in dairy. According to some men, 
women were welcome to make decisions related to taking good care of the cow. For 
other men, women could only make decisions while the husband was away, and 
even then they were supposed to consult the husbands because they are “second in 
command to men.” Women observed that the decisionmaking process was a 
cultural practice, whereby men made all final decisions, and that this could not be 
altered by registering the cow in the woman’s or man’s name. 
Asked what difference it would make if the cow were to be registered in the 
name of the woman or in both the man’s and woman’s names, some participants 
especially women maintained that it would not matter because the cow belonged to 
the household and the social rules could not be changed by registering cows in the 
woman’s name. Some of the men argued that registering the cow in a woman’s 
name would result in the woman’s parents claiming the cow. The concept of 
 
 
11 registering a cow in a woman’s name or in both the name of the man and the 
women was in itself contested. In one men’s FGD, most of the men were opposed 
to this saying cows could never be registered jointly as long as there was a male 
head of household and that registering the cow in a woman’s name or jointly 
between men and women would signify that there is no man in that house. In three 
of the women’s FGDs, and in one men’s FGD, the majority also felt that registering 
the cow under men and women jointly would have no effect on how decisions were 
made because the rules on decisionmaking were , as one participant said, “bigger 
than who the cow was registered under.” 
In summary, the results suggest that focus groups participants had difficulty 
clearly defining what ownership means. Definitions were sometimes vague, and 
examples could be contradictory. FGD facilitators reported that fewer people 
participated in the discussion of these issues as compared to others. This is 
important to keep in mind when interpreting the quantitative data.  
Having said that, it is clear that property rights are both complex and 
gendered. Control rights tend to be held by men, though women may have some 
management-related rights. Understanding the value of management rights will 
require knowing about control of the resulting outputs is distributed. Theory would 
suggest that use rights and management rights would be linked since the ability to 
control the benefits generated by the asset provide the incentive for good 
management. This issue is explored in the following sections.  
6.   IMPACTS OF MSDDP ON MILK PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND 
INCOME 
Milk production 
Most households reported owning livestock at the time the project began, however 
milk production was low. “All milk worth talking about is from improved cows,” said 
one member of a FGD. Households that had received a cow reported producing 
34.8 liters of milk in the last week compared to 2.4 liters for households that had 
not yet received their cows (Table 4). The fact that improved cows were producing 
well suggests that the strategy of training two household members was effective. 
   
 
 
12 Table 4: Milk production and costs 
   Non-recipients  Recipients 
Number of liters of milk produced in last week  2.64  34.81 
  (10.81)  (34.73) 
Money received from MCC and village milk sales in last 
month (MZN)  60.00  1743.11 
  (232.38)  (2025.79) 
Liters of milk sold to MCC, village, or bartered in last 
month   4.69  125.03 
  (18.75)  (156.31) 
Total dairy costs in last month (MZN)  46.56  564.58 
  (101.76)  (719.36) 
Number of observations  25  100 
Mean coefficients; standard deviations in parentheses 
MZN= Mozambican meticale   
Source: calculated from 2011 data 
High milk output comes at a cost. Small-scale dairy production costs are 
estimated to be between 30 and 40 percent of the total dairy gross income at the 
household level (Nhambeto, Marinho, and Hutchinson 2011). According to the 2011 
survey data, households that had received cows spent 565MZM per month on 
purchased inputs related to feed, veterinary treatments, and animal housing 
compared to 47MZM for those who did not have an improved cow. 
Labor use also increases significantly with an improved cow. According to 
FGDs, all household members are involved in dairy production. The common dairy 
activities done by men and women are given in Table 5, and are consistent with 
women having rights to make decisions about how cows are managed. When asked 
for their perceptions about who spends more time on dairying, groups reported that 
women played the major role in management and spent more hands-on time in 
day-to-day activities of dairy production. Focus groups also commented that men 
have a role in "supervising” and appear more involved with infrastructure and 
community issues related to the dairy industry and market for milk. The Vanduzi 
women-only FGD, through a proportional piling exercise, indicated that 41 percent 
of dairy work was done by women, 22 percent by boys, 19 percent by men, and 18 
percent by girls. Women felt that their work load had increased most relative to 
other members of the household. 
   
 
 
13 Table 5: Dairy activities done by men and women, according to focus 
groups 
Activities commonly done by 
men 
Activities commonly done by 
women 
Activities done by 
men and women 
Pasture and forage plot preparation 
Construct Kraal 
Cutting grass for feed 
Purchase of ration 
Inspect cow 
Clean cow teats 
Take milk to milk collection center 
(MCC) 
Report sick cow to Paravet / 
technician 
Feed cows 
Fetch water and put in trough 
(water cows) 
Minor repairs of the kraal 
Selling milk in the market 
Looking for fodder 
Hand dressing cows (removing 
ticks) 
Cleaning Kraal 
Change dirty water 
Milking 
Baling Hay 
Source: focus group discussions 
Household survey results also show that households that had received a cow 
by the time of the 2011 survey spent much more time on both dairy and on crop 
activities than households that had not yet received a cow (Table 6). One 
explanation for the increase in crop labor is that households with improved dairy 
cattle are required to grow fodder to feed the cows, which are kept in stalls rather 
than let out to graze. The results also suggest that men spend more time than 
women on dairy-related work. While this seems to contradict the qualitative results, 
these findings are not directly comparable since the focus groups were asked about 
daily activities and the survey questionnaire included all labor whether occasional 
(for example, building the kraal and purchasing rations) or daily (feeding or 
watering the cow). The survey results also show that children spend a significant 
amount of time in both dairying and crop farming. 
   
 
 
14 Table 6: Breakdown of mean household and hired labor hours, 2011 
   Non-recipients  Recipients 
Cattle (including dairy) labor      
Household male (hours)  4.5  15.16 
  (10.42)  (16.40) 
Hired male(hours)  1.4  4.58 
  (3.74)  (15.07) 
Household female (hours)  1.15  8.09 
  (3.29)  (10.83) 
Hired female (hours)  0  0.47 
  (0.00)  (2.24) 
Household child (<15 years) (hours)  2.16  9.31 
  (3.77)  (16.37) 
     
Crop farming labor      
Household male (hours)  45.18  59.26 
  (35.73)  (54.72) 
Household female (hours)  45.78  52.12 
  (25.34)  (42.69) 
Household child (hours)  9.72  17.11 
  (16.22)  (33.08) 
Number of observations   25  100 
Source: Data from 2011 household survey 
To look more systematically at how dairying affects household labor use, we 
regress household dairy and agricultural labor and hired dairy labor on whether or 
not a household has received a cow and other household characteristics (Table 7). 
Receiving a dairy cow is correlated with an increase in household labor hours on 
dairy activities for males, females, and children. Males had the largest increase in 
dairy labor hours; receiving a cow is associated with 7.26 more labor hours. For 
females the effect is 5.47 hours and for children, 6.69 hours. Male hired dairy hours 
also increases by approximately 5 more labor hours a month while there is no effect 
on female hired dairy hours. FGDs also noted that only men hired labor in response 
to the heavy workload associated with dairying. Receiving a cow is associated with 
an increase in household child labor hours spent on cropping activities though there 
is no effect on male or female household labor hours. 
   
 
 
15 Table 7: Impact of cattle distribution on agricultural labor, by age, sex 
   Labor in dairy (hours)     Labor in cropping (hours) 
   HH 
male 
Hired 
male 
HH 
female 
Hired 
female 
HH 
child 
   HH 
male 
HH 
female 
HH child 
HH received 
cow 
7.26**  5.44*  5.47***  0.34  6.69***    0.65  0.11  9.59* 
  -3.22  -3.09  -1.61  -0.21  -2.45    -10.39  -6.49  -5.47 
Household 
size 
0.79  -0.28  0.65**  0.09  0.82**    3.69**  4.77***  2.30* 
  -0.51  -0.3  -0.32  -0.07  -0.37    -1.5  -1.15  -1.18 
Male 
household 
head 
6.87**  6.17*  2.99  0.22  5.94**    25.10**  14.93  8.23 
  -3.17  -3.17  -2.19  -0.18  -2.83    -10.21  -14.12  -9.65 
Occupation 
of head 
-1.78  -4.14  1.25  0.24  -4    13.06  -13.15  -4.35 
  -4.22  -2.81  -4.69  -0.77  -4.66    -12.25  -9.5  -8.85 
Education of 
head 
0.1  0.52  0.28  0.01  0.32    0.03  0.9  2.71* 
  -0.55  -0.35  -0.36  -0.05  -0.47    -1.57  -1.25  -1.47 
Average yrs. 
of adult 
females 
education 
-0.21  0.43  -0.31  -0.06  -0.51    -1.84  -1.37  -2.50** 
  -0.76  -0.64  -0.53  -0.07  -0.88    -2.65  -1.7  -1.17 
Proportion of 
adult female 
household 
members 
-7.68  0.69  -3.65  0.91  -12.47*    10.7  44.90***  -26.71** 
  -6.61  -3.39  -5.01  -0.82  -6.88    -18.33  -15.49  -12.54 
Manica 
province 
1.06  1.95  -1.52  0.2  2.32    -8.53  3.84  13.18* 
  -3.11  -3.51  -2.05  -0.42  -3.2    -9.46  -7.26  -6.69 
Number of 
cattle owned 
0.52  0.08  0.08  0.01  0.2         
  -0.32  -0.08  -0.19  -0.02  -0.27         
Hectares 
owned 
            0.53  1.13  0.15 
              -0.96  -0.88  -1.09 
Constant  -6.11  -9.03*  -4.71  -1.11  -6.87    -0.56  -27.32  -19.81 
   -6.91  -5.27  -4.62  -1.05  -6.89     -20.16  -20.22  -18.29 
Obs  103  103  103  103  103     103  103  103 
Standard errors in rows below.  
(* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)  
Source: Data from 2011 household survey 
It should be noted that while quantitative data focused on number of hours 
or amount of time, perceptions on labor can include other aspects such as level of 
 
 
16 effort. Women may therefore have felt that they are putting in more labor into dairy 
activities if the activities they are involved in require more effort than those that 
men are involved in, such as cutting and carrying fodder versus taking milk to the 
MCC. The perception of women working more on dairy could also be attributed to 
the relative change in their involvement in dairy compared to the men. Women’s 
labor allocation to dairy rose by 603 percent after the introduction of the dairy cow 
while men’s rose by 246 percent. This is consistent with the observation from the 
men only FGDs that prior the MSDDP, women were not interested in or involved 
with cattle management. 
The increased time spent on dairy implies that household members reduced 
time spent on other productive activities or on leisure. When asked how they coped 
with the increased workload, both men and women said that the introduction of the 
dairy cow “enabled them to become more diligent planners”, which appears to be 
putting a positive spin on a challenging situation. Men noted that the increase in 
their workload had necessitated them to employ laborers to attend to other duties 
as they and their wives attended to the dairy cow. Women had to juggle between 
cropping and dairying activities. In addition, women noted that specific household 
members had to be assigned specific chores. Women had to leave very detailed 
instructions about the cow to the children and hired labor before going to tend the 
crops. Women could no longer stay away from home for long because the cow 
required them to come back and chop and mix feed, and feed and water it. Men in 
FGDs also stated that five women and four men in their community had dropped 
out of the MSDDP after certification because they could not cope with the work load 
they had seen other beneficiary household members experiencing. 
Milk consumption and sale 
While the MSDDP had an explicit focus on developing dairy markets, the increased 
milk production was intended for both home consumption and sale. According to 
the FGDs, women may place a higher priority on the milk consumption and nutrition 
benefits of dairying than men, who primarily value the income. In terms of decision 
making, according to men and women FGD participants, usually the male head of 
household alone or in consultation with his wife decides whether and how much 
milk to sell. During the FGDs, women reported that households sold a slightly 
higher percentage of milk than men did (70 percent versus 60 percent) and saved 
slightly less for the children (10 percent versus 20 percent). These percentages 
were reflective of the training given to them on how to apportion the milk 
production between the three key different uses of sale, consumption, and feeding 
the calf. 
   
 
 
17 Table 8: Household dietary diversity score: summary statistics, by food 
group 
   HH received cattle    
   No  Yes  % change 
HDDS (score)  5.80  6.62  14.14 
(2.61)  (2.50)   (0.15) 
Food group   (% of households that 
consumed it in the last week) 
% change 
Nshima, millet, sorghum, or maize   0.92  1.00  8.70*** 
(0.28)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Rice, bread, or other wheat-based food   0.20  0.34  70.00 
(0.41)  (0.48)  (0.18)  
Pumpkin, carrots, squash, or sweet 
potato 
0.28  0.29   3.57 
(0.46)  (0.46)   (0.92) 
Irish potatoes, cassava, or other 
root/tuber  
0.32  0.38  18.75 
(0.48)  (0.49)  (0.58)  
Dark green leafy vegetables   0.60  0.73  21.67 
(0.50)  (0.45)  (0.21)  
Other vegetables   0.28  0.37  32.14 
(0.46)  (0.49)  (0.40)  
Fruits   0.68  0.65  -4.41 
(0.48)  (0.48)   (0.78) 
Beef, pork, lamb, goat, rabbit, wild 
game, chicken, duck, etc.  
0.24  0.23  -4.17 
(0.44)  (0.42)  (0.91) 
Eggs   0.12  0.12  0.00 
(0.33)  (0.33)  (1.00)  
Fresh or dried fish   0.24  0.34  41.67 
(0.44)  (0.48)   (0.34) 
Beans, peas, lentils, or groundnuts   0.20  0.23  15.00 
(0.41)  (0.42)  (0.75)  
Sour milk yogurt, fresh milk or other 
milk product  
0.12  0.43  258.33*** 
(0.33)  (0.50)  (0.00)  
Oil, fat, or butter   0.56  0.64  14.29 
(0.51)  (0.48)   (0.46) 
Sugar or honey   0.52  0.42  -19.23 
(0.51)  (0.50)  (0.37)  
Coffee, tea, other beverages   0.52  0.51  -1.92 
(0.51)  (0.50)  (0.93)  
Observations  25  100    
Standard errors in row below 
Two-sided p-value from a mean comparison t-test reported under percent change in the third 
column. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Source: 2011 household survey 
 
 
 
18 While we did not measure milk consumption directly, all of the female focus 
groups and most of male groups mentioned that increased milk consumption is 
improving the health status of the household members. Household dietary diversity 
scores4  were, on average, higher in households that had received cows than in 
households that had not (Table 8). Recipient households consumed approximately 
one more food group than households that had not yet received cows, and the 
largest difference between the two groups was in their likelihood of having 
consumed dairy products. These findings are consistent with other studies that 
have found that households engaged in smallholder dairy consume more milk than 
households that do not (Marchetta 2011; Mullins et al. 1996; Wyatt et al. 2013). 
The impacts of dairying on nutrition, especially of young children, are not 
unambiguous, however. Participation in higher levels of dairy production is 
negatively associated with exclusive breastfeeding, but does not affect dietary 
diversity for children over 6 months of age (Wyatt et al. 2013). 
Consistent with their increased production and higher share of milk sold, 
beneficiary households report greater milk sales in volume and value than 
households that had not yet received cows (Table 4). From regression estimates we 
see that beneficiary households sold more milk, by value (Table 9) and volume 
(Table 10) than non-beneficiaries. Having a female trainee is positively correlated 
with the value of milk sales (Table 9), a result that project staff suggest could be 
explained by the greater attention to milk hygiene and quality that women display 
in training. This explanation was echoed in the focus group discussion where it was 
reported that women were more conscious of and concerned with milk hygiene and 
milk quality than men. While higher quality milk does not fetch a higher price at the 
MCC, it is less likely to be rejected. 
   
4 The HDDS is the sum of all food groups consumed by the household in the last 24 hours, asked as a 
yes/no question with 15 total food groups. The HDDS is a proxy measure for the nutritional quality of 
food consumed by household members (Swindale and Bilinsky 2006). 
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                                                       Table 9: Determinants of income from milk sales in the last month (MZM) 
   Model 1   Model 2 
HH received cattle (1 if yes, 0 if still waiting) 
  
1247.4224**   
(515.3749)   
Household had a female trainee 
  
1053.3405**  1019.5298** 
(460.2119)  (498.0601) 
Months since HH received first cattle    -11.4963 
  (34.3267) 
Household size  -98.2291  -117.6745 
(71.8349)  (82.5660) 
Sex of household head  -2280.8869***  -2048.7788*** 
(567.8466)  (753.2562) 
Primary occupation of household head  -457.4000  -334.6073 
(372.9222)  (392.4192) 
Years of education of household head  102.9812  137.5685 
(120.4070)  (131.7445) 
Average yrs. of female education for females over 12 
yrs. 
-70.7879  -31.2615 
(169.7130)  (188.3376) 
Proportion of adult HH members who are female  937.9577  1029.0092 
(1129.0524)  (1230.2967) 
Constant  2058.7452*  3065.4669** 
(1194.8342)  (1330.0778) 
Observations  155  147 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
Source: Data from 2011 and 2012 household survey 
 
   
 
 
20 Table 10: Determinants of liters sold last month 
   1  2 
HH received cattle  73.7820***   
   (27.5877)   
Primary or secondary dairy trainee was female  8.6903  6.9587 
   (32.1106)  (34.6512) 
Months since HH received first cattle    -11.4963 
    (34.3267) 
Household size  -0.9747  -1.0224 
   (4.6245)  (5.4281) 
Sex of household head  -242.3368***  -242.7496*** 
   (47.3435)  (58.5263) 
Primary occupation of household head  -33.0181  -31.4661 
   (23.5938)  (25.1737) 
Years of education of household head  -9.7639  -8.2527 
   (9.7191)  (11.2339) 
Average yrs. of female education for females 
over 12 yrs. 
-8.1051  -8.5777 
   (14.9134)  (16.6245) 
Proportion of adult HH members who are 
female 
95.2302  88.0549 
   (79.0371)  (81.4148) 
Constant  316.7327***  392.4644*** 
   (93.7574)  (117.3276) 
Observations  158  149 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
Source: Data from 2011 and 2012 household survey 
However another possible explanation for this result relates to the fact that 
both lower milk rejection rates and having a female trainee could be related to the 
household’s proximity to the town, consistent with the discussion above regarding 
women having a hard time attending training located far from their land. FGDs also 
mentioned that the quality of milk deteriorated during the period between milking 
and delivery to the distant MCC leading to high milk rejection rates. The data 
available in this study do not permit us to disentangle these effects, but the 
 
 
21 example emphasizes how complex it is to assess impacts in projects in which 
households make choices about how they will participate in programs, and in which 
gender is likely to influence these decisions in different ways. 
Female headed households sell more milk than male headed households 
which may reflect a preference for income over milk, especially if there are fewer 
young children in the household. 
7.   GENDERED CONTROL OF INCOME 
Control of income 
In general, the morning milk, usually a much larger quantity, belongs to men and 
the evening milk to women. During the FGDs, the main reason given for this was 
that most of the morning milk is sold to the MCC by men while the evening milk is 
consumed at home by family and calves, with any surplus sold in the informal 
market by women. While households received a higher price per liter selling milk to 
neighbors than from the collection center ($25 versus $15), the potential for local 
sales can be very limited. Access to an MCC is an important determinant of milk 
production and sales. In the three FGDs where participants had no access to MCCs 
(men and women from Gondola Tete and women from Amatongas Sede) their 
biggest challenge was all the surplus milk they had, such that they were feeding 
their cattle less nutritious feeds so that they produced less milk as a strategy to 
cope with the poor market conditions and high cost of feed. This is a common 
strategy employed by farmers when the supply of milk exceeds the milk demand in 
the market and has also been reported in Kenya (Muriuki et al. 2003). 
Payment for milk delivered to the MCC was made in cash once a month. The 
benefits of being paid in cash monthly at the MCC included the fact that farmers did 
not need to have bank accounts and pay ledger fees as they could purchase their 
monthly requirements with the money. Other projects have found that payment to 
bank accounts made it more difficult for women to access income since the 
accounts were generally in the name of the male household head (EADD 2009). 
Both male and female FGD participants mentioned that being paid monthly enabled 
them to save money for major projects. Men from Gondola, who received daily 
payments, said that they were able to pay for immediate daily needs, such as food 
and medicine, with the milk money. Women from Amatongas Sede found it difficult 
to save money from daily sales and also to find honest customers to sell milk to on 
monthly credit.  
According to the FGD participants, men generally controlled the income from 
sales of milk at the MCC and they decide how to spend it either alone or, in some 
cases, in consultation with their spouses. One of the women groups said that milk 
income was managed jointly by men and women because the advantages of joint 
income management had been discussed during trainings. 
In the Vanduzi FGD, participants discussed what control of income meant. 
One woman participant said that: “By control I mean that I tell my husband how 
much money I have made and what I want to do with it, he agrees, so, I control 
the money.” When the women did a proportional piling exercise of who controls the 
money, results showed 88 percent of men and 12 percent of women controlled the 
milk income. The main reason given by women for this high control of milk income 
 
 
22 by men was that they are the heads of households and they built the Kraal that 
houses the cow. Men were said to document the total milk produced and marketed 
and some women suggested that if a woman took the money without the 
permission of the husband, this could lead to the woman being beaten. Most 
women have to discuss and negotiate how to use the money before they use it to 
avoid conflict.  
Men in the Vanduzi FGD agreed that often they are the ones that control the 
money, they measure and record the amount of milk produced and sold every day. 
At the end of the month, they know what to expect to be paid. Most of the men 
indicated they are the ones that keep the money either at home or in the bank and 
control how it is spent. A proportional piling by the men brought out almost similar 
results to that of women with 72 percent of men and 28 percent of women 
controlling income from milk. Interestingly, men did not mention that they 
controlled the income because they owned the cows but rather because they were 
the heads of households, reflecting that in this context being household head is 
synonymous with owning the cow. 
Spending and investment priorities 
How milk income was spent varied between women and men. However given the 
different ways in which men and women accessed dairy income, it is difficult to say 
to what extent their expenditure patterns reflect different priorities or different 
opportunities based on the amount and the timing of cash received. According to 
the FGDs, men focused more on investments such as in draft animal technology 
and plowing the money back to the cow feed and drugs, whereas women focused 
more on immediate household needs such as children’s education, food, clothing, 
and improvement of household members’ comfort. When asked about the assets 
purchased with dairy income, both men and women report that the main assets 
acquired are controlled by men (Table 11). Only in the case of kitchen utensils did 
women have the rights to buy, control and sell them. Men said that women could 
also sell chickens without permission but only in an emergency and she later has to 
inform him. Men and women’s groups disagreed about whether men had the right 
to sell assets purchased with dairy income on their own without consulting their 
wives. When asked what assets they purchased with income generated from sale of 
bulls, women said that they did not buy any because they did not manage the 
income from sale of bulls. Men reported buying several kinds of assets, including 
agricultural tools, bicycle, construction material and livestock. 
   
 
 
23 Table 11: Types and distribution of rights to assets bought using milk 
income 
Asset  Women FGD  Men FGD 
  % 
reporting 
purchase 
Who 
decides 
to buy 
Who 
controls 
it 
Who 
can 
sell it 
% 
reporting 
purchase 
Who 
decides 
to buy 
Who 
controls 
it 
Who 
can 
sell it 
Kitchen 
utensils 
56  Women  Women  Women  37  Women  Women  Women 
Furniture  16  Men  Men  Men  _  _  _  _ 
Bicycle / 
transport 
12  Men  Men  Men  22  Men  Men  Jointly 
men 
and 
wives 
Livestock 
including 
chicken 
16  Men 
 
Men  Men  13  Men  Men  Jointly 
men 
and 
wives 
Repair 
and /or 
build the 
house 
_  _  _  _  28  Men  Men  Jointly 
men 
and 
wives 
Source: Focus group discussions 
Survey data show slight increases in asset stocks over the project period 
however the only changes that were statistically significant were exotic cattle and 
land (Table 3). None of the changes in distribution of ownership within the 
household was statistically significant. 
8.   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The MSDDP distributed improve dairy cows and training to smallholder farmers in 
Mozambique with the goal of increasing household income. The program was 
gender-blind in the sense that it took the household as the unit of analysis; initially 
both cows and training were given to the head of the household, in most cases a 
man. Participation in training was later expanded to include two people per 
household, and as a result a significant number of women were trained as well. 
While it is difficult to identify the causal mechanisms due to the endogeneity 
of how cows were distributed, the project appears to have led to a significant 
increase in household milk production, sales, and income. Having a female trainee 
may be associated with increased income from milk sales. There is also some 
evidence that participating in MSDDP was associated with an increase in milk 
consumption in the household, and with household ownership not only of cattle but 
also of other non-livestock assets.  
Intensifying dairy production was also associated with a large increase in the 
use of purchased inputs and of labor. While household members who have stayed 
in dairy, and were therefore in our surveys and FGDs, believe that the benefits of 
dairying outweigh the financial and labor costs, the demand for household labor of 
men, women, and children is significant, and the longer run effects of both children 
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case of women, care of small children, should be monitored to avoid unintended 
negative impacts.  
Men and women both appear to have increased their income and assets from 
dairy, and for women this may be especially important source since they were not 
involved with cattle prior to the introduction of improved cows. It seems clear, 
however, that men control the majority of household dairy income and make 
decisions on its use. They also hold more and stronger rights over assets than 
women do. This raises the question of why women contribute so much labor to 
dairy when they control such a small share of the benefits. 
One possibility is that benefits are pooled at the household level, and another 
is that women are not free to decide how much labor to contribute. Neither of these 
is entirely consistent, however, with project staff’s initial observation that women 
were essentially neglecting the cows. A third possible explanation is that the milk 
and income that they do control, combined with the influence they are able to exert 
over that controlled by their husbands, is sufficient to justify the investment of their 
time. If this is the case, it is likely that women are underinvesting in terms of the 
effort they would make if they could control more of the benefits. An implication of 
the MSDDP is that if they could control a larger share of the benefits, they might 
invest more and the total household benefit might be greater.  
A fourth possible explanation comes from the women themselves. Women 
participants in MSDDP reported that because of the important contributions that 
they make to care and maintenance of the improved cow, made possible by the 
technical knowledge that they acquired in the trainings, their husbands are 
consulting them more in decisions. Women appreciate this recognition of their 
skills, and they place value on the feeling that their household is working together 
in a joint livelihood strategy. If women see their participation in the dairy enterprise 
as contributing to a longer term change in intrahousehold gender relations, it would 
explain why they are willing to make the effort, even if it doesn’t seem justified by 
their own direct economic benefit or even the profitability of dairy at the household 
level. These alternative explanations are not mutually exclusive, and while this 
analysis can’t go further to say which are more or less likely or important, simply 
identifying them shows the importance of understanding what kinds of incentives 
projects are providing to men and women.  
Despite being a gender-blind project, gender played a role in MSDDP 
implementation and outcomes. The MSDDP project team came to recognize the 
importance of taking gender into consideration and has shared experiences and 
findings within Land O’Lakes, including as members of the organization’s gender 
task force.  
In the future, gender-sensitive program implementation could allow women 
to better benefit from programs. For example, the feasibility and the practical 
usefulness of joint registration of a cow—with the goal of ensuring stronger control 
rights for women—should be explored further. Women clearly had some rights over 
the improved cows, and despite the widespread recognition that “decisionmaking is 
bigger than whose name the cows is registered under,” there were some examples 
given of where joint registration could be meaningful. Some of the men’s comments 
on what would happen if ownership were joint—women’s families would take the 
cows, people would think there was no man in the household—might reveal more 
 
 
25 about how men felt about the idea than about whether it was possible or what 
would actually happen as a result. 
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